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A patient with suspected malaria was hospitalized suc-
cessively in 2 hospitals, first in Dakar, Senegal, then in
Rennes, France, where tests diagnosed Crimean-Congo
hemorrhagic fever. An international incident management
group was set up in France and Senegal, which traced 181
contacts and analyzed 50 samples from 3 countries. No
secondary cases were identified clinically. 
A
case of imported Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever
(CCHF) was diagnosed in France in November 2004.
Clinical features are described elsewhere (1). The patient
was a 60-year-old French woman who had been hospital-
ized on November 4, 2004, in Dakar, Senegal, for severe
influenzalike illness that had lasted 3 days. As her condi-
tion worsened, she was repatriated to Rennes University
Hospital, France, on November 14. Serum samples
obtained November 15 were sent to the National Reference
Center for Hemorrhagic Fevers (NRCHV, Institut Pasteur,
Lyon, France). Tests for anti-CCHF–specific immunoglob-
ulin (Ig) M antibody by enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay (ELISA) and reverse transcription–PCR were posi-
tive. Tests for anti-CCHF IgG were negative.
After the NRCHV telephoned the diagnosis on
November 22 (18 days after the date of first admission and
8 days after admission at Rennes University Hospital),
control measures were taken immediately by an ad hoc
group of persons and institutions responsible for preven-
tion and control of infectious diseases. Contract tracing at
Rennes Hospital was coordinated by the hospital’s infec-
tion control committee, which identified all contacts
among healthcare workers and persons who had handled or
analyzed the patient’s samples. The regional health author-
ities and epidemiologists from the Cellule Interrégionale
d’Epidémiologie (CIRE) identified and followed-up all
contacts in the patient’s family. The Institut de Veille
Sanitaire (InVS) documented the sequence of medical
management and opportunities for accidental blood expo-
sure to blood (2), informed all the healthcare worker teams
that managed the patient’s care, and coordinated efforts
with the Institut Pasteur of Dakar in Senegal. The NRCHV
made and reported the diagnosis. In Senegal, the Institut
Pasteur was in charge of the investigation and contact trac-
ing, which were carried out by epidemiologists with the
assistance of entomologists and virologists. 
The maximum duration of viremia was estimated to be
12 days, and the disease incubation period was estimated
at 10 days (3,4). The group followed up potentially
exposed persons for 10 days after a possible contact with
the patient from November 4 through November 16, or 10
days after handling blood or tissue samples taken through
November 16. A contact person was defined as anyone
who was in direct contact (for example, family visitor,
healthcare worker) with the patient or with samples taken
from the patient between these dates. Contact persons did
not undergo serologic screening, but all were informed of
the need to self-monitor and were each followed up daily
by a clinician either directly or by phone.
No accidental blood exposure was documented during
healthcare procedures or handling of patient samples by
any of the healthcare teams. Table 1 presents a summary of
the sequence of events and occasions for secondary trans-
mission. In Senegal, the patient had been admitted to a
double room where she remained throughout her stay at
hospital 1, except on the evening of her transfer to hospi-
tal 2. She had undergone several blood tests, received infu-
sions, and had several visits from friends and colleagues.
She had been transferred once to a dental clinic for bleed-
ing gums. In hospital 2, she had been placed in a single
room in the intensive care unit (ICU). Isolation procedures
had been observed, and she had received no visitors. A
central intravenous line had been placed, and blood sam-
ples had been obtained on several occasions. No isolation
precautions were observed in the ambulance that had trans-
ferred her to the ambulance plane to Rennes. On the plane
the patient’s condition had been managed by a German
medical team who had transfused whole blood through an
existing catheter. The team had worn gloves but no masks.
On arrival, she was transferred by ambulance from the
Rennes airport to Rennes University Hospital.
DISPATCHES
1424 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 9, September 2006
*Institut de Veille Sanitaire, Paris, France; †Formerly of Institut
Pasteur, Dakar, Senegal; ‡CHU Pontchaillou, Rennes, France;
and §Centre National de Référence pour les Arboviroses, Lyon,
France
1The members of the incident management group were (in alpha-
betical order) M. Aupée, J.-L. Avril, C. Bailly, B. Branger, J. Dissais,
D. Escourolle, R. Garlantezec, S. Ioos, S. Jauréguiberry, C.
Laguitton, M. Lampérier, R. le Goff, A. Lepoutre, G. Manet, M.
Marquis, C. Michelet, P. Nabeth, C. Paquet, M.-C. Paty, C. Picot,
H. Sénéchal, A. Tall, A. Tarantola, P. Tattevin, S. Veyrat, and H.
Zeller.While in ICU in the Rennes Hospital, isolation precau-
tions were observed (strict adherence to standard precau-
tions [5]; masks; single room). Visitors, however, were
allowed. The masks were simple surgical masks, and the
room was not a negative-pressure room. Blood samples
were obtained repeatedly. 
As her clinical status improved, the patient was trans-
ferred to a single room in the infectious disease department
2 days later. Again, standard precautions were strictly
observed. The first biologic samples were sent to the labo-
ratory in observance with standard procedures but with no
particular additional precautions.
The group identified 71 patient contacts in Senegal and
2 (air ambulance transfer personnel) in Germany (Table 1).
At the Rennes Hospital, 44 staff members in ICU or infec-
tious disease departments, 50 laboratory personnel, and 3
persons responsible for bedside radiography or patient
transfers were identified and contacted (Table 2). Atotal of
50 samples were identified and later destroyed. 
Within 36 hours, the international team had identified
181 contacts among healthcare workers, visitors, fellow
patients, and ambulance drivers in France, Germany, or
Senegal and immediately informed the head physicians of
each team that had cared for the patient since the date of
symptom onset. No accidental blood exposure was identi-
fied, but extensive casual contact was documented. No
secondary cases were identified clinically in any of the 3
countries.
The first symptomatic CCHF case in Senegal was identi-
fied in 2003 (6), but seroprevalence studies indicated that
CCHF virus has been circulating there since 1969 (7,8).
Another unrelated patient with a confirmed case, who had
stayed in the same coastal area as our index case-patient in
late November 2004, also became ill and exhibited fever and
severe bleeding. She died 4 days later, causing no secondary
cases among >4 healthcare workers and 4 friends or col-
leagues who cared for her, including one who sustained
extensive accidental blood exposure but received ribavirin
(P. Nabeth, pers. comm.).
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rhagic fever in France raised several issues. First, the
patient did not have Lassa fever, unlike the diagnosis in
most imported cases of viral hemorrhagic fever in industri-
alized countries (9). Second, the illness did not occur in a
major French metropolitan center with an international air-
port that was home to a large community of migrant work-
ers such as Paris, Lyon, or Marseille. The third issue is that
of transmission and prevention of secondary cases.
Suspected diagnosis was not announced by the team in
Senegal before transfer. Therefore only standard precau-
tions were observed during transfer or during this patient’s
care or the management of her blood and tissue samples.
The patient was transferred and hospitalized in France 10
days after the onset of the first clinical signs. The absence
of secondary cases could therefore be due to low levels of
viremia because by the time the patient arrived in France
the infection was nearing its end. However, no cases were
described in Senegal either, where the patient was also
hospitalized and also underwent invasive procedures in
less stringent isolation conditions during a phase of high
levels of viremia. The observance of standard precautions
was therefore sufficient to prevent clinical secondary cases
in Senegal, Germany, and France, as extensively described
in developing or industrialized country settings (10,11).
Observance of standard precautions has greatly improved
in France and elsewhere during the last decade, as shown
by the documented reduction of occupational infections
and accidental blood exposures in French hospitals
(12,13). These factors may have played a decisive role in
the absence of clinically patent secondary transmission. 
Hemorrhagic fever viruses leave no room for compla-
cency. The risk for transmission and available means of
prevention, however, are becoming increasingly well doc-
umented. This first imported case of CCHF in an industri-
alized country should lead French health authorities to
review available evidence and reexamine the justification
and applicability of the existing, stringent recommenda-
tions for the management of many patients in whom viral
hemorrhagic fever is one of several possible diagnoses.
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